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In this article, we first describe our general inhibitory-control theory and, then, we
describe how we have tested its specific hypotheses on reasoning with brain imaging
techniques in adults and children. The innovative part of this perspective lies in its attempt
to come up with a brain-based synthesis of Jean Piaget’s theory on logical algorithms
and Daniel Kahneman’s theory on intuitive heuristics.
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Based on the numerous scientific data garnered in children of all ages, Jean Piaget (Piaget, 1983)
proposed a seminal model of cognitive development according to which children’s cognitive
abilities developed through four different stages from the sensorimotor stage (from birth to 2 years
of age) to the formal operational stage (starting at 12 years of age). Between two and 7 years
of age (the so-call preoperational stage), Piaget assumed that children were mainly illogical in
comparison to adults. Importantly, during the concrete operational stage, between 7 and 12 years
of age, children start to reason logically in several logico-mathematical domains (e.g., number,
categorization. . .). Finally, after 12 years of age, children’s reasoning is not limited to concrete
objects but can be applied to abstract propositions.
Inhibitory-Control Theory as an Alternative to Piaget’s Theory
In fact, Piaget underestimated the rich precocious logical knowledge already present in infants
and young children, and he overestimated the logical abilities of older children, adolescents and
adults, who commit systematic errors even in very simple logical tasks (Houdé, 2000; Kahneman,
2011). These logical errors usually occur when older children, adolescents and adults rely on
prepotent responses, illogical intuitions, or misleading strategies (such as heuristics) rather than
on logical algorithms. Importantly, the ability to overcome those errors is directly related to the
ability to inhibit these intuitive forms of thinking (Houdé, 2000; Kahneman, 2011; Houdé and
Borst, 2014). Consequently, today the discrete Piagetian stages theory is replaced by an approach
of cognitive development which is analogous to overlapping waves within a non-linear dynamic
system (Siegler, 1999). In such a system, at any point in time and at any age, different strategies
with different degrees of complexity and sophistication might be in conflict in the brain. According
to this theoretical framework, the progressive ability of the prefrontal cortex to inhibit irrelevant
or misleading strategies to activate the most logical one sustains the conceptual development
of children and the shift from one Piagetian stage to the next (Houdé and Borst, 2014). This
constitutes the central assumption of our new neo-Piagetian theory of reasoning development.
During cognitive development, children and adults have to choose, depending on
the context, between two types of strategies or multiple levels of ‘‘thinking fast and
slow’’ (Kahneman, 2011). Typically, individuals can either solve problems using heuristics
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(i.e., intuitions) or logico-mathematical algorithms. On the one
hand, heuristics are typically defined as strategies that are
effortless, rapid, often global or holistic which constitute the
most adaptive response in most situations but sometimes they
are misleading especially in situations in which they compete
with logical algorithms. Algorithms, on the other hand, are
slow, analytical and cognitively costly strategies but they always
provide the correct solution independently of the context.
In most contexts, children and adults spontaneously rely on
heuristics. However, choosing heuristics over algorithms does
not mean that children and adults are irrational per se (Houdé,
2000) or ‘‘happy fools’’ (De Neys et al., 2013). A ‘‘presumption of
rationality’’ is sometimes the best assessment.
Brain Imaging of Reasoning-Bias Inhibition
in Adults: The Example of Deductive Logic
As opposed to Piaget’s theory, which assumed that children
reached a logical stage of reasoning at 12 years of age (i.e., formal
operational stage), a number of studies have now provided
converging evidence that adolescents and adults continue to
make errors in simple deductive reasoning tasks (see e.g., Evans,
1998, 2003; Houdé, 2000). For instance, in the perceptual
matching bias task designed by Evans (Evans, 1998), the vast
majority of participants choose a red square on the left of a
yellow circle to falsify the following rule: ‘‘if there is not a red
square on the left, then there is a yellow circle on the right’’.
Evans attributed this error of logic to a perceptual matching bias
(or heuristic) according to which participants choose the two
geometrical shapes mentioned in the rules because a negation
is present in the antecedent rather than using the logical truth
table (in this case the algorithm). By using the logical truth table,
participants would chose two geometrical shapes (e.g., a blue
diamond to the left of a green square) validating a true antecedent
(i.e., not a red square) and a false consequent (i.e., not a yellow
circle). Critically, in order to avoid systematic logical errors in
this context, participants must resist (or inhibit) the perceptual
matching bias (i.e., red square on the left of a yellow circle) to
activate the logical algorithm.
According to our ‘‘presumption of rationality’’ analysis,
participants’ difficulty in solving this if-then logical problem is
not related to the difficulty of the deductive reasoning per se but
to the difficulty to exert inhibitory control over the misleading
heuristic (i.e., the perceptual matching bias). To provide evidence
for the role of inhibitory control in overcoming deductive
reasoning errors, we contrasted the effect of two types of training
on the ability to perform deductive reasoning tasks. In one
condition, participants were trained to inhibit the perceptual
matching bias. In the other condition, participants received
training focusing on explaining the underlying logic of the task.
Importantly, participants were trained on a different deductive
task (i.e., the Wason task, Wason, 1968) than the one performed
pre- and post-training (i.e., the perceptual matching bias task,
Evans, 1998). The effects of the two types of training were
compared to a test-retest control condition in which participants
simply performed the perceptual matching task two times.
Participants who were trained to inhibit the perceptual matching
heuristic were the only ones who succeeded to overcome their
deductive reasoning errors. This finding suggests that logical
reasoning errors are not due to a lack of logic (or experience)
but to a default to inhibit a misleading heuristic. In a follow-up
PET (positron emission tomography) imaging study in which we
compared the cerebral activation before and after the participants
were trained in inhibiting the perceptual matching bias, we
observed that the brain activation shifted from the posterior
perceptual regions pre-training to prefrontal executive regions
post-training. This is the first micro-longitudinal neuroimaging
study of deductive reasoning and it provides the first evidence
that inhibitory control was critical to reason logically.
Note that this brain imaging study on reasoning errors
correction was conducted on a sample of only eight participants
but the strength of these results stem from the fact that the
participants were their own controls in the pre-post training
comparison. Such intra-individual design is scarce in brain
imaging of reasoning. Indeed Fuster (Fuster, 2003), noted about
our results that ‘‘the exercise of logical reasoning seems to
overcome (or to inhibit) the biasing influences from the posterior
cortex and to lend to prefrontal cortex the effective control
of the reasoning task’’ (p. 231). More specifically, with respect
to our results in the prefrontal cortex, we observed a left-
middle-frontal gyrus activation which was likely to reflect the
logical manipulation of the algorithm in working memory, and
a left-inferior-frontal gyrus activation, which was likely to reflect
inhibition of the reasoning bias (or heuristic) and self-regulatory
inner speech (Broca’s area).
In this brain imaging study, the training condition that
focused on the inhibition of the misleading heuristic comprised
not only cognitive but also emotional executive warnings that
were not incorporated in the training condition focusing on
explaining the underlying logic of the deductive problem. By
directly contrasting the cerebral activity elicited by the two types
of training, we found greater activity (i.e., the rCBF: regional
cerebral blood flow) following inhibitory control training in
the right ventromedial prefrontal cortex (Houdé et al., 2001),
which is a paralimbic emotional area (Mesulam, 2000) known
to be involved in getting the mind on the ‘‘logical track’’ and
avoiding decision-making errors (Damasio et al., 1994; Damasio
and Carvalho, 2013). We speculate that the right ventromedial
prefrontal cortex could serve as an internal warning/self-feeling
device to correct errors during deductive reasoning. Converging
data on the link between emotion, conflict detection and
inhibition were reported by Spiess et al. (2007) and De Neys et al.
(2010).
After these two pioneer brain imaging studies on if-then
rules (Houdé et al., 2000, 2001), a set of new studies were
published during the past decade on deductive reasoning (e.g.,
Noveck et al., 2004; Prado and Noveck, 2007; for reviews see
Goel, 2007; Prado et al., 2011). Noveck et al. (2004) studied
the underlying brain network engaged in deductive reasoning
on abstract contents and found that a left lateralized parietal-
frontal network supported the if-then (or conditional) reasoning.
Importantly, the activation within this network increased as the
reasoning became more complex. As noted by Noveck et al.
(2004), a critical difference between their study and the two
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neuroimaging studies we conducted was that solving Evans’s
problem required a counterintuitive solution---i.e., a solution that
involved inhibiting the misleading heuristic. Prado and Noveck
(2007) using a similar deductive reasoning task as the one we
used provided convergent evidence that the resolution of such
problems involved inhibitory control. In their study, participants
were asked to determine whether a conditional rule such as ‘‘if
there is not a B there is a triangle’’ was falsified (or verified) by an
item (e.g., A and diamond). They reported increased activation
in the right mid-dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (mid-DLPFC),
the medial frontal areas (including the anterior cingulate area),
the pre-supplementary motor area and the parietal cortices
with increasing perceptual mismatch between the conditional
rule and the item (i.e., when the perceptual matching bias was
stronger). Critically, a psychophysiological interaction analysis
revealed that the integration between the visual areas of the brain
(supporting the perceptual matching heuristic) and mid-DLPFC
decreased when the perceptual mismatch increased. Taken
together the results suggest that overcoming the perceptual
matching bias is rooted in part by the inhibitory control exerted
by prefrontal regions (i.e., mid-DLPFC and the medial frontal
cortex) on lower level visual regions.
Note that whereas the left lateral prefrontal structures
(including the left IFG) supported the inhibition of the
misleading heuristic during conditional reasoning in our studies
(Houdé et al., 2000, 2001) subsequent studies reported activation
in the right IFG (e.g., Noveck et al., 2004; Prado and Noveck,
2007; for reviews see Goel, 2007; Prado et al., 2011). We suspect
that the activation in the left prefrontal areas of the brain reported
in our seminal studies could be a consequence of the verbal
nature of the executive training (given between the pre- and
post-test) which would have favored using inhibitory control
in verbal working memory after the training (i.e., during the
post-test). This interpretation is coherent with previous studies
showing that inhibition in verbal working memory is supported
by the left prefrontal areas of the brain (Jonides et al., 1998).
The role of inhibitory control and the prefrontal cortex
(including the inferior frontal gyrus, IFG) in deductive reasoning
has been demonstrated not only using conditional reasoning but
also syllogistic reasoning (De Neys and Van Gelder, 2009; Tsujii
et al., 2010, 2011). For instance, Tsujii et al. (2010) investigated
the network of brain areas involved in syllogistic reasoning.
Critically, prefrontal regions including the right IFG---i.e., a
region consistently activated when a prepotent response (or
a heuristic) is inhibited (see Aron et al., 2004, 2014)---are
specifically recruited when participants judge the validity of
syllogisms in which the logical validity of the conclusion is in
conflict with the belief of the participants (e.g., Valid incongruent
syllogism: No mammals are dogs/All German Shepherd are
mammals/No German Shepherd are dogs). Importantly, a follow-
up study revealed that the ability to reason on belief laden
syllogisms is impaired when the activity of the right IFG is
disrupted using rTMS (i.e., repetitive Transcranial Magnetic
Stimulation). This study provided additional evidence for a
causal relation between the right IFG and the ability to overcome
logical errors through the inhibition of heuristic thinking.
Brain Imaging of Reasoning-Bias Inhibition
in Children: The Example of Number
Conservation
One of the most famous Piagetian problems used for testing
reasoning in children is the number-conservation task (Piaget,
1983). In this problem, the child is first presented with two
rows of tokens with the same number of tokens and the same
length. After the child acknowledges that the two rows contain
the same number of objects, the tokens in one of the rows
are spread apart and the child is asked whether the two rows
contain yet the same number of tokens. Children younger than
6 or 7 years of age tend to report that the longer row contains
more tokens. According to Piaget (1952), young children make
systematic errors in the number-conservation problem because
they rely on an intuitive ‘‘illogical’’ mode of thinking which is a
hallmark of the preoperational stage of cognitive development.
When children reach 6 or 7 years of age, they successfully solve
the number conservation task by understanding the reversibility
of operations (any transformation can be cancelled out by the
reverse transformation) which is evidence that children are in the
concrete operational stage of development.
Following Piaget’s pioneer work, a growing number of studies
were proposed to investigate the cognitive development of
numeracy and raised numerous criticisms of Piaget’s theory. For
instance, studies have demonstrated that newborns and infants
understand that there is an invariance between number and
physical transformations, even in contexts extremely similar as
the one created in the number-conservation problem (Antell and
Keating, 1983; see also Dehaene, 2011). A critical question for
developmental psychologist is thus to understand why newborns
and infants who have some knowledge of the relation between
number and space will later on make systematic errors in the
number-conservation problem until age 6 or 7. This non-linear
pattern of development could be explained by the fact that
children learn a number of heuristics during their childhood
that are most of the times appropriate to find the solution
except in context in which they are misleading and need to be
inhibited (Houdé, 2000; Houdé and Borst, 2014). For instance, in
Piaget’s number-conservation problem, children tend to rely on
the misleading length-equals-number heuristic rather than on a
counting or operational reversibility algorithm.
One of the challenges of today’s research in developmental
psychology is thus to shift from the Piagetian (Piaget, 1983) and
neo-Piagetian (see Demetriou, 1988 for a review) views that the
conceptual change exclusively relies on the growing ability to
coordinate multiple systems of operations to a view according
to which conceptual change is in part rooted in a domain-
general ability of selection-inhibition of competing strategies, i.e.,
heuristics (or intuitions) and logico-mathematical algorithms.
Critically, at each age and in each situation the strengths of
the heuristics and the algorithms fluctuate within a nonlinear
dynamical system (Siegler, 1999; Houdé, 2000; Houdé and Borst,
2014). According to this new model, cognitive development
occurs in bursts with sometimes errors occurring after success
in both children and adults. This model is coherent with what
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we know of the structural changes of the brain from childhood
to adulthood (Casey et al., 2005). Indeed, the inhibition of
heuristics could remain challenging because the maturation
of the prefrontal cortex sustaining inhibitory-control ability
continues throughout childhood and adolescence.
To determine whether the growing ability to perform Piaget’s
number-conservation problem is rooted in the growing ability to
inhibit the length-equals-number heuristic due to the progressive
maturation of the prefrontal cortex, we asked 60 children aged
5--10 to solve Piagetian problems in a functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI) study. We found that children
who succeed in solving Piaget’s number-conservation problems
(i.e., children aged 7 and older) recruited a parieto-frontal
network including the right IFG and the bilateral intra parietal
sulcus (IPS; Houdé et al., 2011)---two regions respectively
involved in inhibition (e.g., Aron et al., 2004, 2014) and
numeracy (e.g., Dehaene, 2011). In a subsequent fMRI study
(Poirel et al., 2012), we provided evidence that the recruitment
of the right IFG was directly related to the need to inhibit a
heuristic by reporting a significant positive correlation between
the BOLD (i.e., the blood-oxygen-level-dependent) signal in
the rIFG and the inhibitory control efficiency as measured by
an Animal Stroop task (Wright et al., 2003)---a Stroop task
adapted for non-reading children. The results we garnered in
schoolchildren are coherent with the ones we reported above
in adolescents and adults for which failure to inhibit a heuristic
led to systematic logical errors although they reached the formal
operational stage according to Piaget’s theory. Note, however,
that our developmental study on number conservation shows
a right-inferior-frontal gyrus activation for inhibition (in line
with Aron et al. (2004, 2014) meta-analysis reviews), while
our adults study on deductive reasoning (Houdé et al., 2000)
showed a left-inferior-frontal gyrus activation for inhibition. In
this last study, there was no Stroop-correlation control, but the
leftward lateralization was probably due to the strong verbal
component (rules) of the logical task, involving self-regulatory
inner speech. The number conservation problem is, inversely, a
visuospatial task which fits well with a rightward lateralization of
the activation.
Conclusion
In this review we want to argue that learning to inhibit
misleading heuristics from System 1 (i.e., intuitive system) when
they interfere with the activation of the logical algorithms
from System 2 (i.e., analytical system, see e.g., Evans, 2003;
Kahneman, 2011) is the critical process that allows one to
reason logically (Houdé, 2000; Goel, 2007; Prado and Noveck,
2007; De Neys and Van Gelder, 2009; Tsujii et al., 2010, 2011;
Prado et al., 2011; Houdé and Borst, 2014). The new post-
Piagetian theoretical framework we propose allows us to better
understand why newborns and infants who possess an early
ability to reason logically in different domains will later in life
have the tendency to reason illogically. Typically, at all ages,
overcoming systematic logical errors relies on blocking (i.e.,
inhibiting) our intuitions, a process that is highly dependent
on the maturation of the prefrontal cortex (Borst et al., 2013).
Finally, the ability to inhibit misleading heuristics remains
challenging throughout our lifetime. Thus children, adolescents
and adults may sometimes need ‘‘prefrontal pedagogy’’ to help
them overcome their tendency to rely on intuitive heuristics and
biases in reasoning tasks (Houdé, 2007).
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